Bureaucratic Goals

     While the EPA is forced to regulate under imperfect information, it is often unclear how they use their positions to satisfy personal goals. The EPA does not have the resources to effectively regulate the environment, so they often rely on the industry being regulated for information. The information-gathering process is often tainted by reporting-bias, and the regulation process is never steadfast and requires substantial bureaucratic discretion in regulatory decisions. Businesses and industry affected by regulations have a strong incentive to influence bureaucratic discretion. While there are ethical concerns over industry having such a significant impact over regulation, industry has the best resources and knowledge over the impact of such regulations (Goodstein and Polasky 260). A problem considered by Goodstein and Polasky is how the industry's access to bureaucrats might influence their discretion that is contradictory to their objective. Agency building, external career building and job satisfaction are three types of goals where personal interests might hinder bureaucratic discretion. These goals can lead to overregulation, under regulation or maintaining the status-quo.

Agency building is often regarded as the main goal of bureaucracy managers. Bureaucracies are constantly pushing for a higher budget in order for more effective tools and power for their personnel. "A bias toward unwarranted growth may lead to 'overregulation'" (Goodstein and Polasky 261). Overregulation then leads to inefficient outcomes and overspending. 

Another personal bureaucratic goal is external career building. Bureaucrats often do not have salaries as high as law or consulting firms, and they often pursue careers in these fields after working in government. When making difficult regulatory decisions, bureaucrats might be considering future careers in industry and make their decisions accordingly. They often have a better grasp of environmental concerns from the industry perspective than from the public. The conflict of interest might influence bureaucracy to under-regulate.

Lastly, job satisfaction goals might be the biggest influencer in bureaucratic discretion. Ideological preferences could sway decisions one way or the other depending on if the regulator leans toward free-market or more environmentally cautious ideologies. Finally, living a "quiet life" is often an easy way to advance in bureaucratic agencies. The quiet life phenomenon refers to decision making that doesn't upset either side of environmental regulation. This often means enforcing the bare minimum. "One former EPA employee maintains that EPA officials are more interested in keeping their heads low than in sticking their necks out...Those who don't cooperate will find lobbyists lobbying for their heads" (Goodstein and Polasky 261). 

                                                                           Works Cited

GOODSTEIN, E. S. (2014). ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT. S.l.: JOHN WILEY.